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JUR]SDICIION SI ATEMENT
' J' 1 i i s a p p e a 1 i s i r o n i 11 :i c I: i i i d i n p s o I' I : a c t C o i :i c) i :i s i o i i s o f 1 a v a I i d O i d e i e i :i t e i z d
oi i October 6, 2009. The Utah Supreme Coui t ) las jurisdiction over this appeal pursuai it
to 1Jtah Code Ann § 78A-3-102(3)0) (West 2009).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

a.

Issue:

Did liic

UJMJJCI ^OUI I

correctly conclude ll lat

IJK

; :•<;;•

exemption found in article XIII. §3(1 )(i) oft! :ie I Jtal i Consliti itioi i was i :iol In nited to
irrigatioi i for agricultt iral purposes?
b.

Stai idai d :)f i e\ ie\ ':

reviewed for correctness.
2003),.,

1 1 lis issi le presei its a qi icsli :: r i • :)f la" < ' , \ ( - I lid :i is

See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 Ul i i . , l i ,

v^i^i

•
c.

D e t e n i n. r itii n h rvv: 1 Jl, nil Cc

[III, § 3(1 )(i); I It. il Cc »ck \ i ii i. §59™ 2-

1111 (2009).
2.

a.

Watei 's

Issue: Did the district coi irt err ii i concluding that the taxatioi i of Summit
'at- : J

iisti il: i itic i i 1 a :ilities

a s personal

property

does

not

constitute

impermissible double taxatioiici
b.

Standard of review: 1 'his issi le presents a mixed question of law and fact.

which is reviewcil 1«#r correctness. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309
(Utah :*>"' *).
c. •
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Determinative law: Utah Const., art. XIII, S ^ , J .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summit Water is a nonprofit, mutual water company that provides water to its
shareholders for household and irrigation use.

Summit County assessed personal

property taxes against Summit Water's water distribution facilities, consisting of
pumping stations, underground storage facilities, well houses, and water pipelines
("water distribution facilities").1 Due to the structure of Summit Water as a nonprofit,
mutual water company, those personal property taxes would be paid by the shareholders
who are also the consumers of water from Summit Water. Those same items were taxed
to Summit Water and to its shareholders both through the value added to their property
by reason of the availability of water and as improvements included in the value of their
real property.
Summit Water appealed the assessment to the Board of Equalization for Summit
County, on the grounds that: (i) the water distribution facilities were improvements to
real property and could not be taxed as personal property; (ii) the water distribution
facilities qualified for the constitutional irrigation exemption to the extent that they were
used for irrigation purposes; and (iii) taxing the water distribution facilities as both
personal and real property constituted impermissible double taxation.
After Summit County denied Summit Water's appeal, Summit Water appealed to
the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission upheld the assessment and Summit Water

1

In Summit Water v. Summit County 2005 UT 73, ^ 4, this Court recognized that the
County's imposition of the personal property tax at issue on Summit Water was part of its
concerted activities in violation of the antitrust laws as alleged in that case. That case
continues.
611 :429705v3
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appealed f : ) III ic Disti ict Coi n t " 1 1 le Disli ict Court, reverse*.: •!••.. T.°v n m i i i , , ^ ion.

exempt from taxation ,c thu cMu.i the) were ubed lor irngat^-n purposes.

Ihe ; ^ ^ n

found the extent of irrigation use to be 5 1 % based on the evidence presented. S\ :i:i i n nit
( "01 inty ai i :l tl \> z I ax Coi i :ii i lissioi i 1 la \ e appeal zd :)ii ill!;; ' tl )• z i i ilu ig tl iat Si u i u i lit v \ atei \s
facilities are exempt from taxation undei the irrigation exemption to m.
Constiiution

The DNirki C.^nr upheld the T.i\ Commission's decision that taxation •••*-

the water di . i\\.:
]j)ipennjsbiOi

. :. ., ',vs i.

: personal . ..

]

^ ^ p e ^ v did ^o* cor^WM1"

i« =
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jistribution Company ("Summit Wifc r ' n -

~

TU L

1.

Sumn

~-

2.

Summit Water's Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish

Summit Water's corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary
• .
corporation.
3.
approximate!

•? use and bene til of the shareholders ».

^

^iv ai /4z.)
\ "v
.

Summit Water provided domestic and irrigation water service to
vidual residences and businesses. (R at 2080 ^]11.)

2

This appeal was first assigned to Judge De ver of the Third District Court. After
briefing and argument Judge Dever issued an opinion on two of the three issues before
the court, finding that the facilities taxed were improvements to real property and not
taxable as personal property and that the tax was not double taxation. (R. at 1608.)
Judge Dever reserved the issue of the irrigation exemption for further consideration.
Thereafter, Judge Dever without explanation withdrew his opinion and, upon inquiry,
recused himself from the case.
611 :429705v3
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4.

51% of the water delivered to Summit Water's shareholders is used for

irrigation purposes, including watering gardens, orchards, meadows, pastures, lawns,
shrubs, and trees. (R. at 2080 1)12.)
5.

Once a share of water from Summit Water is attached to a particular parcel

of property it becomes appurtenant thereto, and the water right cannot be sold or
transferred separate from the property. (R. at 2080 1(8.)
6.

The By-laws of Summit Water provide for assessments of Class A, B, C

and D stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs (individual
costs) to the shareholder causing such increased costs.

For example, shareholders

seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees, and shareholders whose
lands lie at higher elevations and require pumping are assessed the additional costs of
pumping. (R. at 2082^21.)
7.

A shareholder proposing an expansion to the system must pay for the costs

of the expansion. Upon completion of the expansion, the affected shares of stock become
appurtenant to the project and thereafter are sold and conveyed as an appurtenance to the
project. (R. at 316.)
8.

Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there

is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties could not be
developed for either residential or commercial purposes. (R. at 2080 ^10.)
9.

Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and a

water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair market value
than real property that has no water, with all other property characteristics being equal.

611 :429705v3
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T -

•

".creases the va

'% or more over a s i n ^ a lot

without water. (R. at 2082 1|20.)
-<cal P M H I ! \ iaxo- in Sinmn:: i . ap{\ are based on a tax rate multiplied by
the assessed vi..^

inc. u a property

> "'"all le of tl le 1 eal pi opei (y.

The assessed value is based on the fair market

"1 1 le 1 iipl ici tl le as ,s< asaa ad ^ 'alu< \ ll :ic i i IOI e tl :ie pi c pei ty : :;| > n: ICI

p a y s in real p r o p e r t y lax. ( R . at 2 1 4 7 p p . 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 . , * i . ..,.,
11.

B e c a u s e of the » niqiu ^ t n i c l m i <• r a rnuiaa] -^AW* K m-pai^ am personal

pi npulv Lixis. t

•

• • .-i-'iy passed

through to Summit Water's shareholders. ^R. ai 2083 ^22.)
^pon

a:^a>.as n

proportionate share

~- • a \ '

*"•* . , *--

•..iri':M>ld.:r'

•

-.a\ .

. av * ^

aa company's assets

1

.

water storage facilities "ior ano un bc!;al: el ib i-Jiareholders."1 (R. at 2080 T]l4.)
Si immit Water's "water rights, water soi irce capacity, storage facilities and
)

o^:«„n -Aale; Lm, ~. ,ca^i oevui parcels oi real property containing its
water distribution facilities.
I I 11 in i h

Those properties are taxed as real property by Summit
I | I ' ml "II IK i 1| " (i I

I in. i M i l l m i 11 in ill I ill ni nil II Li il <i. ni I ni ni ni

those properties, and

nropertic

MTVHI

I h e I mi" m a t l a i v a l u e n l

In "111111m111II W ilhnii

mil n n i i n i

shareholders, includes the value of the water distribution facilities appurtenai,i ^
properties.
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Ii, ill
UJu,v

16.

A substantial portion of Summit Water's water nights are judicially decreed

and State Engineer-approved irrigation-use water rights. (R. at 244 ^8.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly found that the irrigation exemption for water facilities
in Article XIII Section 2 Paragraph 5 of the Utah Constitution applies to facilities used
for the artificial watering of land, and is not restricted, as argued by the Tax Commission,
only to the artificial watering of lands for growing agricultural crops.

First, the

Constitutional exemption is clear and its plain language places no restriction on the use of
the facilities other than that they must be "owned and used . . . for irrigating land . . . ."
Utah Const., art. XIII, § 2. To impose an "agriculture" limitation on that exemption
would be beyond the plain language of the exemption and contrary to the principles of
constitutional interpretation.
Second, even if the Court were to look to the meaning of "irrigation" in an
historical context as advocated by the Tax Commission, the law of Utah has
unequivocally recognized that "irrigation" means far more than watering agricultural
crops and extends to the artificial watering of land for aesthetic as well as commercial
agricultural purposes. E.g., Rohwer v. Chadwick, 26 P. 1116 (Utah 1891); Mt. Olivet
Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925); In re Gen. Determination of
Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1. Contrary to the Tax Commission's arguments,
there is no Utah case restricting the term "irrigation" to a commercial or agricultural
purpose.

611 :429705v3
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Third, even looking outside Utah case law there is nothing to restrict the term
irrigation as advocated by the Tax Commission. Aside from the questionable relevance
of the inquiry, looking at the various definitions of irrigation found in cases, books and
treatises reveals a generally broad historical definition of that term, encompassing the
watering of lands for a variety of purposes including, but certainly not limited to.
agriculture.
The Tax Commission urges this Court to impose a condition on the irrigation
exemption to the Utah Constitution found nowhere in the language of the Constitution
and unsupported by the decisions of this Court. That request must be rejected.
In addition, the district court failed to recognize the double taxation to the Summit
Water shareholders that would attend the personal property tax Summit County sought to
impose.

The district court found that the facilities the county sought to tax were

improvements to real property. No appeal was taken from that decision. Those facilities
have therefore already been taxed as part of the real property on which they are situated
and in the value added to the properties, owned exclusively by Summit Water
shareholders, provided with water. The personal property tax would be paid by those
same Summit Water shareholders. The Utah Constitution does not permit such double
taxation.

611 429705v3
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ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMIT WATER'S WATER DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES QUALIFY
FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRIGATION EXEMPTION
A.

The Water Distribution Facilities Are Used For "Irrigating Land."

The Utah Constitution provides a tax exemption for water facilities to the extent
they are used to deliver water to irrigate lands within the state.
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes, and flumes owned and used by individuals or
corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such
individuals or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be
exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used
for such purposes.
Utah Const., art. XIII, § 2 (emphasis added). The enabling statute then in effect, section
59-2-1111, is virtually the same as the constitutional provision.
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes, and flumes owned and used by individuals or
corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by those
individuals or corporations, or by the individual members of the
corporation, are exempt from taxation to the extent that they are
owned and used for irrigation purposes.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the Tax Commission's argument, nothing within the plain language of
the irrigation exemption limits its application to purely "agricultural" uses.

The

exemption applies simply and "to the extent" that water systems are used "for irrigating
land."

611 :429705v3
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B.

The Plain Meaning of '"Irrigation" Includes All Artificial Watering of
Land.

The starting point for the Court's analysis of the scope of the irrigation exemption
is the text itself. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57 ^29, 52 P.3d 1148 ("In
interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the language of the constitution
itself") "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws
such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain
import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary
intelligence and experience." In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Young). 1999 UT 6.
^]60 (Utah 1999) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

"In construing

constitutional as well as statutory provisions, it is to be assumed that the words used
were chosen advisedly, and terms should be given an interpretation and an application in
accord with their commonly understood meaning." Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d
673, 675 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
If the constitutional provision is clear, "then extraneous or contemporaneous
construction may not be resorted to." Id. (quoting University of Utah v. Board of
Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (Utah 1956). "We need not inquire
beyond the plain meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless we find it
ambiguous." Grand County, 2002 UT 57 ^29 (emphasis added).3

3

According to Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), the reason for the rule
prohibiting extraneous or contemporaneous construction of facially plain and
unambiguous constitutional provisions is that the rule "prevents judges from 'finding5 an
ambiguity in even the most plain language of a constitutional or statutory provision as an
611 :429705v3
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The language of the irrigation exemption is clear and unambiguous. By its own
terms, this provision exempts from taxation certain property simply to the extent that it is
used for the purpose of "irrigating land within the state." Utah Const., art. X11I. § 2. The
plain meaning of the term "irrigation" as commonly understood is the artificial watering
of land. (R. at 2102.) As set forth in detail below, the use of the term "irrigation" in Utah
case law aptly demonstrates this. The text of the irrigation exemption does not limit the
exemption to any particular irrigation use or purpose. It makes no distinction whatsoever
between commercial versus residential use, agricultural versus horticultural or pastoral
use, or between the use of irrigation for sustenance versus beautification.

It applies

generally and broadly to any irrigation use, without regard to the purpose for that
irrigation. That is the plain meaning of the provision and the plain import of the language
as would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission contends that the exemption must be read as
limited only to "agricultural" irrigation. Yet, nowhere within the text of the irrigation
exemption is there any limitation whatsoever to a specific irrigation purpose—let alone to
agricultural purposes only. Had the drafters intended to limit application of the irrigation
exemption solely to agricultural irrigation, they very easily and plainly could have done
so by simply inserting the word "agricultural" before the word "purposes" in the last
sentence. They did not do so. Therefore, the Court must presume that the drafters chose

excuse to search the legislative history in an attempt to justify an interpretation they
prefer." Id at 850 n. 14.
611 :429705v3
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the words and phrases used therein carefully and advisedly and not restrict the exemption
beyond the plain language of the constitution. See Nephi City, 779 P.2d at 675.
Because the plain meaning of the irrigation exemption is clear on its face, the
Court need not, and indeed cannot, delve into extraneous materials in an attempt to
discern the hearts and minds of the drafters. The district court did not find that the
irrigation exemption was ambiguous, nor has the Tax Commission argued that it is.
Rather, the Tax Commission has ignored the plain meaning of the text and instead
jumped straight into extraneous and contemporaneous materials in an attempt to find
support for its proposed construction. This is improper. Because the plain meaning of
the term "irrigation" is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry ends there.
C.

Contemporaneous and Extraneous Materials Do Not Support the Tax
Commission's Interpretation of the Irrigation Exemption.

Even if the Court were to determine that the text of the irrigation exemption was
ambiguous, contemporaneous and extraneous sources clearly demonstrate that the term
"irrigation" has not been restricted solely to agricultural irrigation.

The plain and

ordinary meaning of the term "irrigation," as used by courts and legislatures throughout
the history of Utah, has encompassed all artificial watering of land without regard to the
specific purpose for irrigating the land.
1.

Utah Case Law

Contrary to the Tax Commission's claim, Utah case law clearly shows that the
term "irrigation" has historically been used in a very broad sense to refer generally to the
artificial watering of land. In fact, as noted by the district court, the Utah Supreme Court

611 :429705v3
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has used the term "irrigation** in a wide variety of contexts to refer to the watering of
crops on a large farm, the watering of vegetables in a household garden, the watering of
pastures for stock, the watering of grass and shade trees in one's yard, and even the
watering of ornamental vegetation in a cemetery. (R. at 2102.)
a.

Early cases

In Rohwer v. Chadwick. 26 P. 1116 (Utah 1891), a case decided just five years
before enactment of the irrigation exemption, the Utah Supreme Court used the term
"irrigate" in the following context:
The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff lived on Fisher creek; had a
farm there, used the water of the same for irrigating purposes on her farm,
to irrigate her meadow land and her crops and garden and orchard
and shade-trees . . .
Id. (emphasis added). If, as the Tax Commission contends, the ordinary and accepted
meaning of the term "irrigation" in the late 1800s encompassed only agricultural
irrigation for raising food crops, then the Utah Supreme Court would not have used the
term so broadly to apply to the watering of land for far more diverse purposes, including
for purposes of cultivating "meadow land" and "shade-trees". The fact that it did so,
directly contradicts the Tax Commission's argument.
Numerous additional cases from the late 1800s likewise show common and
generic usage of the term "irrigation" to refer to the watering of land, without any inquiry
or consideration whatsoever by the Court into its intended use. See, e.g., Munroe v. I vie,
2 Utah 535 (Utah 1880) (referring to "artificial irrigation" without consideration of
purpose of irrigation); Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 165 (Utah 1881) (referring to

611 :429705v3
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"water used to irrigate land adjacent" without analysis of purpose of irrigation); Stowell
v. Johnson, 26 P. 290 (Utah 1891) (referring to "irrigation of land" with no analysis of
the purposes for "irrigating"); Holman v. Pleasant Grove City. 30 P. 72 (Utah 1892)
(referring to "irrigation of plaintiffs land" without consideration of purpose for
irrigation). In fact, there is not a single Utah case using the term "irrigation" in the
narrow sense of agricultural food production. Without exception, the early case law
refers to "irrigation" in its broad, generic sense of any artificial watering of land for any
purpose. The Tax Commission's argument to the contrary simply does not square with
early Utah case law.
b.

Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City

Notably, in another early case, Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City. 235
P. 876 (Utah 1925), the Utah Supreme Court, repeatedly used the term "irrigation" to
refer to the watering of land for non-agricultural purposes. Specifically, the Court noted
that commencing in about 1860 the water in dispute had used by certain residents "for
the irrigation, through surface ditches, of their city lots." Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
The Court further found that since 1874 when the cemetery was established the water had
used "for the irrigation of the cemetery grounds." Id, at 876-77.
A portion of it is in lawn grass, ornamental shrubbery and trees, and the
remainder is in process of being similarly cultivated. Rows of trees have
been set out around the exterior boundaries, and the whole area had been
planted with crops and irrigated at times pursuant to the purpose of
4

None of the early cases cited by the Tax Commission stands for the proposition that the
term "irrigation" has been used historically to mean only agricultural irrigation. To the
contrary, each of these cases merely demonstrates that agriculture was but one purpose
for irrigation.
611 :429705v3
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ornamenting and beautifying the whole area as a burial ground. We think
the evidence warrants the conclusion that the appropriation of the cemetery
association was for the irrigation of the entire area of 70 acres. There is
a [sic] considerable opinion evidence in the record upon the duty of water
for irrigation of the cemetery grounds. . . .
Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added). "[T]he irrigation of the city lots referred to and the
cemetery grounds" continued for 35 years until 1909 when the cemetery acquired another
50 acres and "water from the source in controversy was used beneficially for the
irrigation of the 70 acres of cemetery grounds . . . ." Ld. at 876-77. The Court concluded
that the cemetery had beneficially used the water at issue for irrigation of its 70 acres,
finding that the 1 cubic foot of water would serve an area of 55 to 90 acres. Id. at 203-04.
In order to find the use of the water "reasonably necessary" for the irrigation of the 70
acres the Court stated:
It is conceded that the irrigation of lawn grass, flowers, ornamental
shrubbery and trees such as grown in a cemetery requires a somewhat
greater quantity of water than ordinary agricultural crops.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added). That statement makes clear that irrigation extended beyond
the agricultural limitation the Tax Commission seeks to impose. The Tax Commission
directly acknowledged in its district court brief that irrigating a cemetery was not an
agricultural purpose. (R. at 1574.) In doing so, the Tax Commission admits that Mt.
Olivet contradicts its position that the word "irrigation" in the late 1800s referred only to
agricultural irrigation.
The Tax Commission's various attempts to distinguish Mt. Olivet are unavailing.
The Tax Commission first sought to distinguish Mt. Olivet in the district court by arguing
that the case merely stands for the proposition that "water used for land occupied for the
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dearly departed is not the same as water used for land occupied by the living who
personally care for their own lawns, trees, gardens and shrubbery." (R. at 1474.) In
doing so. the Tax Commission conceded that the irrigation exemption was not limited to
only agricultural irrigation but also to the irrigation of cemeteries.

The Tax

Commissions interpretation of Mt. Olivet would therefore mean that the constitutional
irrigation exemption must be construed as limited to both agricultural irrigation and to the
irrigation of land occupied by cemeteries; however, land occupied by living people would
be ineligible for the exemption if not used for agricultural food production. It goes
without saying that there is no basis in Utah law or common sense for such a distinction.
The Tax Commission has taken a different approach to Mt. Olivet before this
Court. Now, the Tax Commission argues that the Court's use of the term "irrigation" in
Mt. Olivet is irrelevant because the case did not specifically construe the irrigation
exemption. (Tax Comm'n Appellate Br. at 13.) First, it is clear from the decision that
the appropriation of the water at issue was tied to its irrigation use, first for city lots and
later for the cemetery grounds. Second, the Tax Commission's argument flies in the face
of its claim that the word "irrigation" must be read in its historical context and that the
drafters of the irrigation exemption selected that term "irrigation" based on its historical
meaning. The Mt. Olivet case and the prior Utah Supreme Court case law are directly
relevant to the issue of what the term "irrigation" meant historically in Utah.
Furthermore, the Tax Commission's purported objection to the Mt. Olivet case is
curious given its own reliance on Utah case law and copies of old dictionaries and books
as evidence of the historical meaning of the term "irrigation." None of these materials
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deal at all with the use of the term "irrigation7" in the context of the irrigation exemption
in the Utah Constitution. The Tax Commission cannot have it both ways. It cannot rely
on materials showing the use of the term "irrigation" outside of the context of the
property tax exemption while rejecting the use of that term in Mt. Olivet and prior Utah
Supreme Court case law on that basis. It cannot claim an historical meaning for the term
"irrigation'* that is different from its plain meaning, and then refuse to consider all
evidence of the historical meaning of that word, including the plentiful Utah case law
demonstrating far broader use of the term "irrigation" than merely agricultural irrigation.
c.

In re Gen. Determination of Water Rights

The historical meaning of the term "irrigation" in the case law as defining any
artificial watering of land has continued to the present time. In a recent case, In re Gen.
Determination of Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1, the Utah Supreme Court
considered whether the water at issue had been put to beneficial use in irrigation and held
that watering "natural vegetation on the property" was an irrigation use and constituted a
beneficial use of the irrigation water right at issue. Id. at ffl| 15, 54. The Court agreed
with the district court that the "irrigation [of natural vegetation] produced the benefits of,
'among others,' 'satisfying aesthetic desires,' 'reducing the fire hazard,' and 'creating
property line buffers.'" Id. at ^1 53. The Court held that this was a beneficial, irrigation
use of the owner's irrigation water right and rejected the challenge to those rights for
non-use. Id. at^j 54.
In short, the Tax Commission's claim that the term "irrigation" has been used
historically to refer only to the watering of agricultural crops is without support. Its claim
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is directly contradicted by the historical use of that term throughout the case law

From

at least 1881 through the present time, the case law consistently shows broad usage of the
term "irrigation" to describe any artificial watering of land, regardless of purpose

In

fact, there is not a single case in Utah limiting the use of the term "irrigation* to
agricultural use
d.

Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne

The primary case relied upon by the Tax Commission in support of its errant
position is Holliday Water Co v Lambourne. 466 P 2d 371 (Utah 1970) However this
case simply does not say what the Tax Commission claims it does
At issue in Holliday Water was simply whether use of water for domestic culinary
purposes qualified as an "irrigation" use under the old irrigation exemption

The older,

then m effect version of the irrigation exemption required that water systems be used
"exclusively" for irrigation purposes in order to qualify for the exemption

It was this

exclusivity requirement that was at issue in Holliday Water because the plaintiff water
company supplied water for both outdoor irrigation use and indoor domestic use

The

water company argued that the irrigation exemption applied to the "artificial diversion of
water for any useful purpose," including indoor domestic use, despite the then-existing
requirement that it be used "exclusively" for "irrigating land " IdL at 372 The trial court
rightly rejected this argument, concluding that the irrigation exemption was "strictly
limited to property used exclusively for irrigating lands " Id Because indoor domestic
use of water did not constitute "irrigating land," the water company was not supplying
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water "exclusively" for "irrigating land" and therefore did nol qualify for the exemption
Id, at 373.
The Holliday Water Court never reached the issue of whether the watering of
lawns, shrubs, and shade trees was included within the meaning of the term "irrigating
land." In fact, the issue of whether "irrigating land" included nonagricultural irrigation
was irrelevant to the case because the water company was not supplying the water
"exclusively" for outdoor irrigation use but also for indoor domestic use. Because it was
not, the inquiry ended there. Had the Court reached this issue, its research surely would
have uncovered Mt. Olivet and the abundant Utah case law dating back to the 1880s.
wherein the term "irrigation" was used broadly to encompass all artificial watering of
land without regard to its purpose.
Much has been made at the various stages of these proceedings of the citation to
the definition of "irrigation" in the 1970 edition of American Jurisprudence in Holliday
Water. Because the Court did not quote the treatise, it is impossible to tell from the case
exactly what that 1970s-era treatise said. However, the Holliday Water Court cited to the
treatise as defining "irrigation" as the "the artificial watering of agricultural land in
regions where the rainfall is insufficient for crops; the ordinary and popular conception
denotes the application of water to land for the production of crops and embraces all
artificial watering of land." IdL at 372-73. The Tax Commission seized on the first part
of that definition as evidence that "irrigation" is limited to the water of agricultural land,
while Summit Water has emphasized the latter part of the definition which says that the
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"ordinary and popular conception'" of the term irrigation "embraces all artificial watering
of land."
In reality, this citation is of little probative value. First it demonstrates, at best,
what one author apparently understood to be the definition of "irrigation" in 1970, which
was 75 years after enactment of the irrigation exemption. In fact, the current edition of
American Jurisprudence includes a far broader definition of "irrigation" than that
promoted by the Tax Commission—one that is not limited to agricultural use and
specifically rejects the idea that irrigation is tied to agricultural use:
The term "irrigation" ordinarily denotes the application of water to land for
the production of crops. The diversion of water for the purpose of irrigation
contemplates that something will be grown. The terms "irrigation" and
"agricultural use" are not synonymous or coextensive, where the
applicable statute favors agricultural use. However, "irrigationM need not
be narrowly construed, and may include providing moisture for plant
growth in sloughs and marshlands to provide a habitat for waterfowl, and
water used for frost protection.
45 Am. Jur. 2d Irrigation § 1 (2010) (emphasis added).
Second, the 1970 citation to American Jurisprudence is ambiguous at best and
contradictory at worst. The original language is not quoted in the Holliday Water case
and terms such as "agricultural land" are not defined. Finally, the citation is mere dicta
on an issue not before the Court and, given the aforementioned shortcomings, has no
precedential value whatsoever.
The Holliday Water case likewise has little application to the present dispute.
Summit Water is not claiming that the irrigation exemption applies to indoor domestic
use of its water, and the current version of the irrigation tax exemption applies simply "to
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the extent that" water distribution facilities are used to "irrigate land " This 1970 case is
not on point, not relevant to the issue before this Court, and of no probative value in
determining the historical meaning of a term chosen nearly 100 years earlier by the
drafters of the constitutional irrigation tax exemption 5
e.

Beneficial Use

Much of the Utah case law involving the term "irrigation" is in the context of
water rights and. specifically, whether a water right is being used for irrigation, domestic,
or other purposes A recent example is In re Gen Determination of Water Rights, 2004
UT 67, 98 P.3d 1. in which this Court considered whether a particular irrigation water
right was subject to forfeiture because the water had not been beneficially used. In that
case the water right in question had been changed in approximately 1981 from an historic
domestic use to an irrigation use through a change application filed with the state
engineer. Id. at ^1 12

As an irrigation water right, the water must have been put to

beneficial use for irrigation purposes in order to avoid forfeiture for nonuse.
The holder of the right argued that the water had been put to
beneficial use "to cultivate trees . . . and that the water was otherwise put to
beneficial use irrigating indigenous vegetation on the property." Id. at ^| 14.
5

The case of Washington County v. State Tax Common, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943)
likewise does not stand for this proposition. The judge in this case merely opined,
without any research or analysis, that the irrigation exemption was "probably adopted in
pursuance of a general public policy designed to encourage the cultivation and irrigation
of arid lands." Id. at 566 (emphasis added). The Court can determine for itself the value
of this speculation; however, nothing in this language limits either the term "cultivation"
or the term "irrigation" to agriculture. Even if the term "cultivation" could be construed
as being limited to agricultural cultivation (as opposed to horticultural or pastoral
cultivation), it is not used synonymously with the term "irrigation." In fact, the use of the
phrase "cultivation and irrigation" in the sentence quoted, demonstrates that the two
terms do not mean exactly the same thing.
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The Court ruled that the water had been put to beneficial use for irrigation
purposes, agreeing with the district court that the "irrigation [of natural
vegetation] produced the benefits of. 'among others.* 'satisfying aesthetic
desires.' 'reducing the fire hazard/ and 'creating property line buffers ""
I d at H 53.
This Court thereafter affirmed the trial court and rejected the challenge to those rights for
non-use. Id. at ^| 54
In re Gen. Determination of Water Rights is actually an extreme example of a
beneficial use of an irrigation water right because it does not involve the use of the water
to grow anything, but rather to simply maintain the vegetation already in existence The
use of irrigation water to grow lawns, trees and gardens not indigenous to the property as
in this case is a far easier application of the concept of irrigation.
2.

Books and Dictionaries

The Tax Commission's reliance on old books and dictionaries also adds little
support to their cause, particularly in light of the far more probative Utah Supreme Court
case law. First the Tax Commission cites to a 1899 edition of the Universal Dictionary of
the English Language, which defines irrigation as "[t]he act of watering land by causing a
stream to flow and spread over it." (Tax Comm'n Br., add. E.) This broad, expansive
definition does not support the Tax Commission's narrow definition; it contradicts it.
The Tax Commission also cites to what it claims to be an 1895 edition of the American
Dictionary of the English Language, which defines irrigation as "the act of watering or
moistening" and also "in agriculture, the operation of causing water to flow over lands,
for nourishing plants." (Id., add. F.) Neither of these similarly broad and expansive
definitions supports the Tax Commission's claim that the term "irrigation" must be read
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as being narrowly limited to agricultural crop production. In fact, they support Summit
Water's position.
The Tax Commission then cites a 1910 book, Irrigation Institutions, the subtitle of
which declares that it is limited to "a discussion of the economic and legal questions
created by the growth of irrigated agriculture in the West." kf, add. G. One might
naturally assume that such a book would be limited to discussing irrigation in the
agricultural context. The fact that it may or may not do so, which is admittedly difficult
to determine based on the three pages provided from this 410-page book, is of little
consequence. The same could be said of the book, IrriRation in Utah, from which the Tax
Commission provides only four pages of a 212-page book. Even then, one of the pages
provided curiously refers to more than just agricultural irrigation; it also references
irrigation for "horticulture," which (at the risk of opening a Pandora's box into tracing
100 years of its meaning), was coined in the 1600s from the Latin for "horticultural
meaning "cultivation of a garden," and is generally defined as "the cultivation of a
garden, orchard, or nursery; the cultivation of flowers, fruits., vegetables, or ornamental
plants." See add. A, attached hereto (emphasis added). At best, these two books merely
demonstrate that agricultural food production is and has been but one of the uses for
irrigation in Utah.
3.

Tax Commission Standards

Finally, the Tax Commission's reliance on its own "long-established practice" of
allegedly limiting the irrigation exemption to agricultural purposes is irrelevant and
unsupported.
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administrative agency's interpretation"' of a tax exemption. Sanders Brine Shrimp v.
Audit Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P 2d 1304, 1305-06 (Utah 1993) ("It is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its
governing statutes Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a governing statute is
invalid ")

The Tax Commission's interpretation of the constitutional irrigation tax

exemption is simply not germane to the Court's analysis.
Furthermore, the Tax Commission has provided no proof whatsoever of its
allegedly "long-established" practice. Although it cites to the "Commission's Standards
of Practice.'' it has never at any point in these proceedings provided a copy of those
materials. Nor has it documented just how long ago it purportedly established these
"long-established'* practices In fact, it appears from the discussion in the Holliday Water
case that from at least 1931 through 1963, no taxes were assessed on the subject water
systems despite the fact that they were not used exclusively for agricultural irrigation.
Holliday Water, 466 P.2d at 372. The plaintiff in that case further contended that "county
assessors since statehood have so interpreted [the irrigation exemption in] Section 2 that
water rights, pipelines, and pumping plants, owned by mutual water companies,
regardless of use, have not been taxed." Id, at 373 (emphasis added). It does not appear
that the tax assessor disputed this.
D.

The Tax Commission's Interpretation Would Lead to an Absurd
Result.

An equally compelling reason for rejecting the interpretation urged by the Tax
Commission is the "principle that constitutional provisions should be interpreted to avoid
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absurd results v State v Willis, 2004 UT 93 1116, 100 P 3d 1218. 1222 (Utah 2004). This
Court has declared "[l]t is our responsibility, when confronted by an ambiguous
constitutional provision, to interpret the provision in a manner that avoids absurd results."
id_
The Tax Commission's interpretation of the irrigation exemption as limited to
agricultural irrigation would lead to an absurd, nonsensical, and unmanageable result.
The irrigation exemption applies "to the extent that'* the water distribution system is used
for irrigation purposes If the Tax Commission is correct that this exemption applies only
to agricultural uses, then any company seeking the exemption would have to be able to
account for precisely how much of its system was used to deliver water for "agricultural"
purposes, as defined by the Tax Commission. There is simply no reasonable way to
distinguish between what is an agricultural irrigation use and what is not. For example,
presumably the Tax Commission would concede that irrigating farm food crops is an
agricultural use, as is irrigating backyard vegetable gardens and fruit trees. Yet, in a
backyard garden, vegetable plants and fruit trees are often intermingled with decorative
and ornamental plants and shrubs. Ornamental flowers and shrubs are often planted to
attract bees and other beneficial insects and other plants may be used to repel insects
which feast on crops. Fruit trees may be planted for shade and never harvested. Some
flowers and plants are edible but used primarily for beautification. One simply cannot
distinguish between all of these beneficial uses and determine which are "agricultural"
and which are not.
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Furthermore, how could a nonprofit water company, like Summit Water, quantify
and report how much of its system was used for agricultural versus nonagricultural
irrigation? It could not accurately do so even if it visited every backyard of every one of
its users. A water company can determine what percentage of its system is used to
supply water for outdoor irrigation use versus indoor culinary use based on seasonal flow
rates. However, it simply has no way of determining how much of the outdoor irrigation
use is for ''agricultural" versus "nonagricultural" use.
The absurdity of interpreting a constitutional provision to require the impossible is
obvious. Therefore, even if the plain language of the irrigation exemption could possibly
be read to limit its application to agricultural irrigation, the Court is bound to reject such
an interpretation.
E.

Conclusion

The plain and literal language of the term "irrigation" in the irrigation exemption
simply means "irrigating land within the state." The usual and accepted meaning of the
term "irrigation," and the definition that has been accepted by Utah courts for over a
century, encompasses aH artificial watering of land, whether for growing vegetables in a
household garden, watering ornamental vegetation in a cemetery, or watering grass,
shrubs, and shade trees on residential property.
Despite the plain language of the constitutional irrigation exemption, the Tax
Commission has impermissibly narrowed its availability by mandating that only
agricultural use for watering of crops qualifies as "irrigation." In so doing, the Tax
Commission has clearly exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority. "It is a long-
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standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its
governing statutes. Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a governing statute is
invalid." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304;
1306 (Utah 1993).
The Tax Commission cannot limit the availability of a constitutional tax
exemption without clear and express authority to do so. By unilaterally declaring that the
irrigation exemption applies only to irrigation for strictly agricultural purposes, the Tax
Commission has "improperly restricted]" the availability of Ihe exemption without any
corresponding statutory of constitutional authority to do so. Id.
This Court should therefore uphold the decision of the district court and find that
the irrigation exemption is not limited to the Tax Commission's narrow definition of
agricultural irrigation.
II.

SUMMIT COUNTY'S TAXATION OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION
FACILITIES OF SUMMIT WATER AS PERSONAL PROPERTY
CONSTITUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION.
The taxation of Summit Water's water distribution facilities as personal property

impermissibly subjects those facilities and Summit Water's shareholders to double
taxation in violation of the Utah Constitution. The water distribution facilities are already
taxed as real property though their contribution to the fair market value of the property on
which they are situated and the property they serve. Those taxes are paid by the Summit
Water shareholders, either directly as to their own property or as assessed to them as
shareholders for real property taxes paid by Summit Water. Those same shareholders
also are assessed and pay any personal property tax imposed on those water distribution
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facilities because the shareholders pay all expenses of Summit Water under its structure
as a non-profit mutual water company.6 Other homeowners are not taxed twice on the
water delivery systems providing water to their homes as are Summit Water shareholders
A.

Summit Water Shareholders
Distribution Facilities.

are Taxed

Twice on the

Water

Summit County receives increased real property tax revenue because the water
distribution facilities are part of the fair market value of the real property on which they
are sited and the real property they serve. The facilities are situated on real property
owned by Summit Water and Summit Water shareholders and are part of what makes up
the fair market value of that real property. Further, as a direct result of the water supplied
to Summit Water shareholders through Summit Water's water distribution facilities, the
value of that real property is enhanced, again impacting the fair market value which is the
basis for taxation of those properties.

Without Summit Water's water distribution

facilities. Summit County would receive less tax revenue from real property tax of
property served by those water distribution facilities, including a reduction of at least
50% in the fair market value of the real property owned by Summit Water shareholders
and served by Summit Water.

This conclusion is fully supported by the Tax

Commission's own findings:

The district court ruled that the water distribution facilities are improvements to real
property and, as such, are not subject to personal property tax. (R. at 2106.) The Tax
Commission did not appeal that ruling. However, at the urging of the Tax Commission,
the Utah Legislature subsequently amended the relevant statutes to purportedly allow the
Tax Commission to define personal property to include any improvements to real
property. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(19)(c).
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Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there
is no municipal water source available Without water these properties
could not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes Real
property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and water
supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair
market value than real property that has no water, wiih all other property
characteristics being equal The availability of water to a lot increases the
value by 50% of more over a similar lot without water The increase in
market value is the result of the availability of water to the lot
(R at 1091 H 6) (emphasis added)
Because real property tax assessments are, and must be. based solely on the fair
market value of the property, Summit County already taxes the value of the water
distribution facilities as part of the fair market value of the land on which they are
situated and which they serve. The value of water and the means of supplying that water
are "directly reflected in the property value ' (R at 1140 ^| 7 )
Viewed as independent property rights, ditches and the right to use the
water conveyed by them are property subject to taxation: but, when made
appurtenant to lands, they have no independent use. So situated and used,
the value of this species of property enters as an element into the value of
the corpus or principal estate to which it is attached or appurtenant, and
bears its proportionate burden of taxation by the added taxable value which
it gives to the principal estate.
Brady Irr. Co. v. Teton County, 85 P.2d 350, 351 (Mont. 1938) (emphasis added).
Because Summit County already receives real property tax revenues directly attributable
to the water distribution facilities, Summit County cannot tax the water distribution
facilities again by also assessing their value as personal property. To do so is a direct
violation of the constitutional prohibitions against double taxation.
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Nevertheless, the district court erroneously concluded that taxing the water
distribution facilities both as personal property and as part of the real property valuation
did not constitute double taxation. The district court's conclusions in this regard reveal a
clear misapprehension of the unique structure of cooperative water distribution
companies in general and of Summit Water's operations in particular.
Summit Water is a mutual nonprofit corporation owned by its shareholders. The
company was founded to pool the water resources of its shareholders and provide a
system for the delivery of water to shareholder-owned lands.

Unlike a regular

corporation or utility. Summit Water shareholders own "an actual proportionate
ownership interest in the water rights of the corporation, as well as a corresponding
interest in the diverting facilities, distribution works and water storage facilities." (R. at
746 U 2.) The shareholders in regular corporations and utilities do not own the assets of
the company at all, let alone a proportionate interest in the assets. The identity of
shareholders and customers is also not the same in those companies, as it is with Summit
Water. Utility companies, for example, must provide service to all within their service
area, not just to a specific class of shareholders. Attempting to analogize Summit Water
to a regular corporation or utility is inappropriate and inaccurate.
Summit Water provided clear and undisputed testimony that its water distribution
facilities are owned solely and proportionately by Summit Water's Class B shareholders.
According to Summit Water's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, all of the real and
personal property of Summit Water, including specifically the water distribution
facilities, is owned by the shareholders who are connected to and using water, i.e., the
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Class B shareholders. Id. Accordingly, the value of Summit Water's system is directly
proportionate to the market value of the lands served by the system.
The district court correctly rejected the Tax Commission's contention that
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (1970), permitted double taxation. (R.
at 2096 n.4.) As the district court noted, the Holliday Water Court did not even reach this
issue. The Court simply found that the petitioning water company did not meet its
burden of providing evidence sufficient to prove double taxation.
Unlike the taxpayer in Holliday Water, Summit Water clearly presented evidence
that Summit County receives real property tax based on the fair market value of the real
property served by its water distribution system and should not be able to also tax that
same water distribution system as personal property. To do so constitutes impermissible
double taxation.
B.

Summit Water Shareholders and Other Water Customers are Not
Treated the Same.

Other property owners, however, are not separately taxed on the value of the
delivery system providing water to their property as personal property. For example,
Mountain Regional and Park City Municipal Water Special Service District both serve
water to the residents of the Snyderville Basin. Neither of these two entities is subject to
personal property tax assessment and neither are their customers. Similarly, individual
water systems, common throughout the Snyderville Basin, are not assessed separately for
personal property tax purposes. Therefore, the issue of unconstitutional double taxation
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only arises with property served by Summit Water, not by municipal or individual
systems.
This double taxation treatment violates Article Xlll of the Utah Constitution.
These provisions [Sections 2 and 3. Article Xlll] of the Constitution in
plain and explicit terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of
taxation in this state so that every person, company, and corporation will be
compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his, her, or its pro rata of the
burdens of general taxation according to the value of the taxable property of
such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated that, when property
is once assessed for general taxes according to its value and at the same rate
as other property subject to the same tax is assessed, it may again be taxed
in some other way when the burden of both taxes falls on the same
person, and while other property subject to the same tax is assessed but
once.
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970) (quoting McCormick &
Co. v. Bassett. 164 P. 852 (1917)) (emphasis added).
Because real property tax assessments are based on the fair market value of the
property, Summit County already taxes the value of the water distribution facilities as
part of the fair market value of the land on which they are situated and which they serve.
Under the personal property tax assessed by Summit County, Summit Water shareholders
bear the burden of both real property taxes and personal property taxes based on the
water distribution facilities.

They are therefore subject to unconstitutional double

taxation.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the ruling of the district court that
Summit Water's water distribution facilities are exempt from taxation under Article XIII
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution to the extent those facilities provide water for the
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artificial watering of land

This Court should reverse the district court's decision on

double taxation and find that the personal pioperty tax imposed violates the prohibitions
against double taxation in Article XUl Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution
DATED this ^

day of July, 2010
VAN COTT. BAGLEY. CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY

SCOTT M L1LJA
NICOLE M DEFORGE
Attorneys for Summit Water Distribution Company
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